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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OVERVIEW
Just after the close of the survey period, the United States Supreme
Court decided Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. . Natural Resources Defense Council.'
Baltimore Gas & Elcctric is significant for two reasons. First, it is the final
pronouncement by the Supreme Court in the litigation concerning the valid-
ity of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) rule that was the subject
of the landmark administrative law case Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council.2 Second, while Baltimore Gas & Electric did
not make any profound change in administrative jurisprudence, it is a con-
temporary Supreme Court reaffirmation of the philosophy announced in Ver-
mont Yankee: the fundamental principle guiding judicial review of
administrative action must be one of deference. As long as a federal agency
complies with substantive and procedural statutory requirements, a review-
ing court must defer to agency decisionmaking even when "the court is un-
happy with the result reached."
'3
The Tenth Circuit did not deviate from this general rule of judicial
deference during the survey period. The court decided thirty cases involving
review of agency decisionmaking, and in only three of these cases did the
Tenth Circuit directly reverse an agency decision.4 One of these three cases
was especially important because the Tenth Circuit, apparently for the first
time, permitted the estoppel doctrine to be used against the federal
government. 5
This survey considers the estoppel case in some detail because of its nov-
elty. Another Tenth Circuit decision, which considers the propriety of ge-
neric rulemaking, is also given considerable treatment. The case, United
States v. Thompson,6 concerned the attempt of antinuclear demonstrators to
use an administrative law defense to avoid criminal prosecution under a fed-
eral antitrespassing statute. The third case given in-depth treatment in-
volved the creation of an exception to the primary jurisdiction doctrine.7
Other administrative law cases reviewed for this survey deal primarily with
judicial review of agency action, and are given less extensive treatment. Un-
1. 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
2. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
3. 103 S. Ct. at 2252 (quoting Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 555).
4. See Home Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Nimmo, 695 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982) (for discus-
sion see infra notes 75-157 and accompanying text); Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407 (10th Cir.
1983) (per curiam) (for discussion see infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text); Cavitt v.
Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1983) (for discussion see infra notes 167-71 and accompany-
ing text).
5. Home Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Nimmo, 695 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982).
6. 687 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1982). For discussion of this case see in/ra notes 8-75 and
accompanying text.
7. Mountain States Natural Gas Corp. v. Petroleum Corp. of Texas, 693 F.2d 1015 (10th
Cir. 1983). For discussion of this case see infra notes 198-236 and accompanying text.
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published decisions, and published decisions of little precedential impact, are
omitted from this article.
I. GENERIC RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: UNITED STATES V.
THOMPSON
A. The Case in Context
Probably the most notable administrative law case decided by the
Tenth Circuit during this survey period was United States v. Thompson,8 a four
to three en banc decision. Thompson upheld federal trespassing convictions
against antinuclear demonstrators at Rocky Flats (a nuclear weapons manu-
facturing facility),9 rejecting the demonstrators' assertion that their convic-
tions were invalid because the Department of Energy (DOE) did not
conduct rulemaking proceedings prior to designating the trespass area off-
limits.' 0 In so doing, the Tenth Circuit en banc reversed a previous Tenth
Circuit which had found the convictions invalid."1
The issue in Thompson was whether DOE could rely upon a generic
rulemaking,' 2 promulgated two decades earlier pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 2278a,13 as a sufficient basis for designating the area where the demonstra-
tors were arrested as off-limits. Important to this article's analysis, generic
rulemaking issues were also treated in the landmark Vermont Yankee decision
and its sequel, Baltimore Gas & Electrzc.4
Vermont Yankee established a judicial policy against imposing procedural
requirements on agencies15 in addition to the bare minimum prescribed by
either the organic statute
16 or the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).17
This policy has been criticized as a major setback in the development of
administrative jurisprudence because it potentially destroys an entire body
8. 687 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1982).
9. Id at 1286.
10. Id
11. See United States v. Seward, No. 79-1711 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 1981),rev'dsubnom. United
States v. Thompson, 687 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1982)(en banc).
12. A generic rulemaking sets out the regulatory principles or procedures which will con-
trol a class of subsequent administrative actions.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2278a (1976). Relevant section 2278a regulations are found at 10 C.F.R.
§§ 860.1-.8 (1983).
At the time the regulations were promulgated, the Atomic Energy Commission was the
agency authorized to implement section 2278a. This authority is now vested in DOE. See 42
U.S.C. § 7151 (Supp. V 1981) (listing powers assumed by DOE). See also 687 F.2d at 1286 n.2
(McKay, J., dissenting) (tracing source of DOE power under section 2278a).
14. The issue in Thompson, in essence, was whether a generic rulemaking could be used to
implement the provisions of section 2278a. In Vermont Yankee and Baltimore Gas &Elec. the issue
was whether adoption of the generic rulemaking approach constituted an abuse of discretion.
As discussed below, the majority in Thompson should have decided the case by evaluating the
validity of the initial generic rulemaking as was done in Vermont Yankee and Baltimore Gas &Elec.
See in/ta notes 37-64 and accompanying text.
15. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated: "Agencies are free to grant addi-
tional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not
free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them." 435 U.S. at 524.
16. "Organic statute," when referred to in this article, means the statute authorizing
agency action.
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982).
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of judge-made administrative common law. 18 Nonetheless, Baltimore Gas &
Electric sustains the policy of deference established by Vermont Yankee. ' 9 Ac-
cordingly, the Tenth Circuit's Thompson decision (which rejects an attempt
to require DOE to engage in rulemaking not specifically required by organic
statute or APA) is in harmony with the policy of deference established by the
Supreme Court.
The Tenth Circuit did not, however, resolve the rulemaking issue in
Thompson by employing an analysis similar to that used in Vermont Yankee
and Baltimore Gas &Electric, where the Court focused on whether the generic
implementing regulation conformed with the controlling statute.2 0 The
Tenth Circuit instead became embroiled in a debate over the significance of
designating the additional property as off-limits, and accordingly failed to
focus on whether DOE's actions were taken pursuant to a valid generic
rule.2 1 As a result, Judge McKay's forcefully stated dissent 22 is more persua-
sive than it should have been. The remainder of this comment analyzes the
Thompson opinions based upon a generic rulemaking approach.
B. Statement of the Case
The dispute in Thompson stemmed from an attempt by antinuclear dem-
onstrators to use a technical administrative law defense to overturn their
criminal convictions for trespassing at Rocky Flats.23 The demonstrators
were arrested for violating 42 U.S.C. § 2278a,2 4 a federal statute prohibiting
18. See, e.g., 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 6:36-:37 (2d ed. 1979).
19. Baltimore Gas &Elec., 103 S. Ct. at 2252. The trend towards greater judicial deference
to the executive branch in the area of administrative law, beginning with Vermont Yankee, is
reinforced by the recent Supreme Court decision holding that the legislative veto is unconstitu-
tional. See INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
20. Baltimore Gas &Elec., 103 S. Ct. at 2251-52; Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524.
21. See infia notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
22. United States v. Thompson, 687 F.2d at 1286 (McKay, J., dissenting).
23. The Rocky Flats Nuclear Plant Site, located in Jefferson County, Colorado, is owned
by the Department of Energy and operated by Rockwell International, a private contractor.
United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 789 (1983)
(companion case to Thompson dealing with another group of Rocky Flats demonstrators arrested
the same day). A number of other cases dealing with the same illegal demonstration were dis-
posed of by the Seward and Thompson decisions. See United States v. Adams, 687 F.2d 1318 (10th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Grodsky, 687 F.2d 1317 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ellsberg,
687 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1982) United States v. Rolfe, 687 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1982) cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 790 (1983); United States v. Ficurra, 687 F.2d 1314 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Gruber, 687 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Stewart, 687 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir.
1982); United States v. Hueftle, 687 F.2d 1305 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Dukehart, 687
F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Grose, 687 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Peters, 687 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1982).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2278a (1976) provides:
(a) The Commission is authorized to issue regulations relating to the entry upon
or carrying, transporting, or otherwise introducing or causing to be introduced any
dangerous weapon, explosive, or other dangerous instrument or material likely to pro-
duce substantial injury or damage to persons or property, into or upon any facility,
installation, or real property subject to the jurisdiction, administration, or in the cus-
tody of the Commission. Every such regulation of the Commission shall be posted
conspicuously at the location involved.
(b) Whoever shall willfully violate any regulation of the Commission issued pur-
suant to subsection (a) of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable by
a fine of not more than $1,000.
(c) Whoever shall willfully violate any regulation of the Commission issued pur-
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unlawful entry onto federal, nuclear-related facilities.25 Several of the dem-
onstrators were arrested in an area designated off-limits pursuant to this fed-
eral statute only sixteen days prior to the arrests. 26 These demonstrators
claimed their arrests were invalid because no rulemaking proceeding was
conducted prior to the designation,2 7 as allegedly required by the APA.
28
DOE apparently argued that an additional rulemaking proceeding was
unnecessary because the designation was proper based upon earlier generic
regulations implementing section 2278a. 29 These regulations, properly
adopted in 1963 pursuant to the APA, 30 require only two acts in order to
designate an area as off-limits: 1) publishing notice of the designation in the
Federal Register,31 and 2) posting the affected area with notices setting forth
the prohibitions.32 Because DOE's designation of the arrest area satisfied
both of these requirements, the majority held that section 2278a was validly
applied to the demonstrators.
33
The dissent, written by Judge McKay and joined by Judges Seymour
and Logan, essentially characterized DOE's argument as an agency's at-
tempt to use its own regulations to circumvent the public protections pro-
vided by the notice and comment provisions of the APA. 34 The dissent's
position was that the designation of the additional property was a "rule" as
defined by the APA. 35 DOE was therefore required to follow the notice and
comment procedures of the APA prior to the designation; having failed to do
so, the off-limits designation was null and void, with the result that the con-
victions were similarly invalid.
36
suant to subsection (a) of this section with respect to any installation or other property
which is enclosed by a fence, wall, floor, roof, or other structural barrier shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not to
exceed $5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
Power to act pursuant to this statute is now vested in DOE. See supra note 13.
25. Id See also S. REP. No. 2530, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4426, 4430.
26. Thompson, 687 F.2d at 1281-83. The designation was made on April 13, 1979. 44 Fed.
Reg. 22,145 (1979). The demonstrators were arrested on April 29, 1979. 687 F.2d at 1281.
27. See United States v. Seward, No. 79-1711 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 198 1),rev'dsub nom. United
States v. Thompson, 687 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
28. Id Section 4 of the APA (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982)), requires an
agency proposing to adopt substantive rules to publish notice of the proposed rule in the Federal
Register at least 30 days prior to the rule's proposed effective date. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (1982).
Exemptions are found when the rule involves military affairs or the management of public
property, id. § 553(a), or when exigencies justify circumventing the notice and comment re-
quirements. Id § 553(b)(B).
For more background on the defendant's original administrative challenges of their convic-
tion and the initial decision by the Tenth Circuit, see Administrative Law, Eighth Annual Tenth
Circuit Survey, 59 DEN. L.J. 174-76 (1982).
29. 687 F.2d at 1281-82. The regulations implementing section 2278a are codified at 10
C.F.R. §§ 860.1-.8 (1983).
30. 687 F.2d at 1282.
31. 10 C.F.R. § 860.7 (1983).
32. Id
33. 687 F.2d at 1281-83.
34. According to the dissent: "An agency should not be permitted to exempt itself from
the congressionally mandated requirements of the APA through its own regulation." Id at
1291 (McKay, J., dissenting).
35. Id See also 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982) (defining rule to include agency statements
designed to interpret or prescribe law).
36. 687 F.2d at 1291-95 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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C. The MajOrity Opinion: A Critique
The majority opinion failed to show persuasively why the designation of
the additional land as off-limits was proper. While the majority initially
recognized the generic nature of the section 2278a regulations, 37 the major-
ity's analysis consisted primarily of attempts to minimize the importance of
the additional designation. 38 The majority did not clearly state that the ge-
neric implementing regulation was a legislative rule, nor did the majority
articulate that because the regulation was a legislative rule the scope of the
court's review was narrow, limited to determining whether the rule was arbi-
trary or capricious. 39 Only in one short paragraph did the majority address
whether the generic implementing regulation was legislative or interpreta-
tive. 4° The majority cited Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 41 for the proposition that
the generic regulation was the only rulemaking necessary to implement the
statute.42 Reliance upon Skidmore is difficult to understand, however, be-
cause Skidmore stands for the proposition that interpretative rules, although
not controlling upon the courts, nonetheless provide guidance that a review-
ing court may follow. 43 The generic implementing regulation at issue in
Thompson, however, is clearly legislative in character. 44 If the majority had
focused on characterizing the generic implementing regulation as a legisla-
tive rule subject to limited review, the conclusion that DOE's designation
was proper would have been more persuasive.
In the same short paragraph where the Skidmore citation appears the
Tenth Circuit cites Batterton v. Francis45 which, unlike Skidmore, deals specifi-
cally with the legal significance of legislative rules. Batlerton stands for the
proposition that if Congress delegates legislative rulemaking authority to an
agency, judicial review of the agency's legislative rules is limited to an inves-
tigation of whether the rules are arbitrary or capricious and are therefore in
excess of delegated authority, 46 or whether the agency has arbitrarily ap-
37. Id. at 1282-83.
38. For example, the majority characterized the designation as being merely ministerial,
i. at 1285, and argued that the regulations had been promulgated under the "management of
government property" exception to the APA's rulemaking requirements. Id See 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(a)(2) (1982).
39. Cf Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977) (review of legislative regulations
duly promulgated pursuant to APA limited to inquiry into whether regulations are arbitrary or
capricious and therefore in excess of delegated authority).
40. 687 F.2d at 1284. For an overview of the significance of the legislative-interpretative
distinction, see 2 K. DAvis, supra note 18, at § 7:8.
41. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
42. 687 F.2d at 1284.
43. 323 U.S. at 140. See also 2 K. DAviS, supra note 18, at § 7:10.
44. Section 2278a specifically authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to promulgate
regulations to implement the statute. (Authority to act pursuant to those regulations was later
transferred to DOE. See supra note 13). Specific statutory authorization to promulgate regula-
tions is generally treated as a delegation of authority to promulgate legislative regulations. See
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-03 (1979); 2 K. DAvis, supra note 18, at § 7:8.
Additionally, section 2278a(b) provides that violations of regulations issued pursuant to section
2278a will be punishable, clearly indicating congressional delegation of lawmaking power. See
supra note 24.
45. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
46. Id. at 425-26.
1984]
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plied the rule.4 7 Accordingly, DOE's action could only be set aside upon a
showing that use of a generic implementing regulation was an arbitrary or
capricious interpretion of section 2278a, or upon a showing that the regula-
tions had been arbitrarily applied.
Section 2278a was enacted to assist in protecting nuclear facilities
against security dangers created by unauthorized entry.48 The Senate report
accompanying the statute plainly stated that the authority conferred would
be standby authority.4 9 Section 2278a manifests this congressional intent to
create agency discretion in controlling application of the antitrespassing law:
the only limitation section 2278a places on agency discretion in promulgat-
ing regulations is the requirement that notice of designation be posted.5 °
Given the scope of agency discretion and the standby nature of agency au-
thority, use of a generic implementing regulation does not appear to be an
"arbitrary and capricious" interpretation of the statute. Given the absence
of any allegation that the section 2278a regulations were arbitrarily applied
to the Rocky Flats demonstrators, and in light of the limited scope ofjudicial
review, the agency's designation was clearly lawful.
Perhaps the reason the Tenth Circuit majority chose to focus its analysis
on the designation rather than the validity of the implementing regulation
was to refute the demonstrators' argument based uponjoseph v. United States
Civil Service Commission .5 At issue in Joseph was a regulation, 52 promulgated
by the United States Civil Service Commission (Commission), which ex-
empted government employees in certain cities from the Hatch Act. 5 3 The
Commission attempted to add the District of Columbia to the list of exempt
cities without engaging in the notice and comment rulemaking procedures
mandated by the APA.5 4 When this action was challenged, the Commission
argued that the amendment was an "interpretative" rule and that rulemak-
ing proceedings were therefore not required to add the District of Columbia
to the list. 55 The District of Columbia Circuit disagreed, finding that be-
cause the Commission's actions involved promulgation of legislative rules,
rulemaking proceedings were required prior to adding a city to the list.
5 6
The majority in Thompson attempted to distinguishJoseph on its facts.
57
The dissent, on the other hand, considered the situation in Thompson a "close
47. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) (providing for judicial review of wrongful agency action).
48. S. REP. No. 2530, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprntted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4426, 4430.
49. Id
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2278a(a) (1976).
51. 554 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
52. 5 C.F.R. § 733.124(c) (1984).
53. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7328 (1982). The Hatch Act is designed to prevent federal employees
from actively engaging in political campaigns. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 (1947). The Civil Service Commission is authorized to create specified exemptions to the
Hatch Act. 5 U.S.C. § 7327(b) (1982) (as amended).
54. 554 F.2d at 1152.
55. Id, at 1152-53.
56. Id
57. The majority stated: "The point is, of course, that something entirely new, a new city,
was added injoseph which had not been considered before. This is quite different from the case
before us where all [facilities subject to designation] had been considered before . . .and the
regulation applied to all." 687 F.2d at 1284.
[Vol. 61:2
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comparison" 58 to the situation in Joseph and found the reasoning applied in
Joseph to be "directly applicable" to Thompson.59 Noticeably absent in either
the majority's or the dissent's treatment of Joseph was a comparison between
the statutes at issue in Joseph and Thompson. Comparison of the two statutes
shows that the analysis used in Joseph was not appropriate for Thompson,
making Joseph inapposite.
The statute at issue in Joseph gave discretionary rulemaking authority
to the Commission to promulgate rules exempting government employees in
certain cities from restrictions imposed by the Hatch Act.6" Before the Com-
mission could make such an exemption, however, the statute required the
Commission to make two findings vital to the statutory purpose: 1) the mu-
nicipality was in either Maryland or Virginia or a "majority of the voters are
employed by the Government of the United States"; 61 and 2) special or unu-
sual circumstances existed making an exemption in the "domestic interest"
of the employees or individuals in the particular municipality. 62 These two
statutorily required findings must be made for each municipality to be ex-
empted from the Hatch Act. Therefore, given the statutory requirements,
an individual rulemaking proceeding was necessary to create the record nec-
essary to ensure that the Commission had not exceeded its authority, abused
its discretion, or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in granting an exemption.
The statute in Thompson presents a different situation because there are
no such statutorily prescribed preconditions which must be evaluated in or-
der to effectuate the statute. All that is required of an agency enforcing sec-
tion 2278a is to provide the detail on where and how the statute will be
enforced. 63  Given this much authorized agency discretion, a generic
rulemaking that provides this detail satisfies the requirements of the APA.
The majority missed an important point by failing to analyze the very differ-
ent statutory requirements imposed in each case. In Joseph, a rulemaking
proceeding was needed to make a record sufficient to substantiate important
statutorily required findings.64 In Thompson, however, the generic regulation
58. Id at 1292 (McKay, J., dissenting).
59. Id. The Joseph court reasoned that because a declaration of exemption was binding on
a court, and because only legislative regulations can bind courts, the declaration of exemption
was a legislative rule subject to the APA's notice and comment requirements. 554 F.2d at 1152-
53. Judge McKay reasoned that because an off-limits designation was binding on a court, Jo-
seph's legislative rule rationale required notice and comment proceedings for all designations.
687 F.2d at 1293-93 (McKay, J., dissenting).
60. The statute interpreted inJosph reads: "The Office of Personnel Management [for-
merly the Civil Service Commission] . . . may prescribe regulations permitting employees and
individuals [covered by the Hatch Act] . . . to take an active part in political management and
political campaigns involving the municipality or other political subdivisions in which they
reside." 5 U.S.C. § 7327(b) (1982).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 7327(b)(1) (1982). InJoseph, the Court determined that the first part of the
regulation applied to the geographical areas adjacent to Washington, D.C., but not to Washing-
ton, D.C. itself. 554 F.2d at 1154-55. A regulation which exempted the District of Columbia
from the Hatch Act could therefore only be valid if a majority of the voters within the District
of Columbia worked for the government of the United States. Id at 1155.
62. 5 U.S.C. § 7327(b)(2) (1982).
63. See supra note 25 (full text of section 2278a).
64. The importance of a rulemaking record to support an exemption is shown by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit's conclusion that the then-existing record was inadequate to sustain a
1984]
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detailing how the statute was going to be implemented satisfied the statutory
mandate.
D. The Dissent
By concentrating on the designation itself rather than the nature of the
implementing regulation and the proper scope of review, the majority un-
necessarily provided the dissent with a basis for its analysis. The dissent
highlighed the significant impact the designation had upon the demonstra-
tors, turning a political protest previously free from federal strictures into a
federal crime.65 The majority's brief generic regulation discussion was criti-
cized as allowing an agency to circumvent the APA's procedural protec-
tions.6 6 Given the more than interpretative nature of these regulations and
the significant power they conferred, policy considerations required applica-
tion of the APA absent a specific statutory exemption. 6 7 Essentially, the dis-
senter believed that permitting the agency to rely upon the earlier generic




The antitrespassing statute in Thompson gave DOE the authority to
promugate legislative rules.6 9 Judicial review of those rules and any action
taken pursuant thereto is limited to investigating whether the agency has
acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 70 Section 2278a required only that agency
rules detail how the statute would be administered. The generic implement-
ing regulation promulgated by DOE appears to satisfy this statutory con-
cern. Accordingly, the generic implementing regulation is a valid legislative
rule. As such, use of a generic implementing regulation which allows addi-
tional land to be made off-limits merely by posting the appropriate signs and
publishing a notice in the Federal Register, 7 1 is a sound exercise of the
finding that the majority of the voters in the District of Columbia were employees of the United
States government. 554 F.2d at 1157.
65. Probably the best summary of the dissent's position is the following:
[Slince we deal with a difficult question in the murky field of administrative lawmak-
ing, interpretation, and administration, I believe that any doubt about the APA's ap-
plicability ought to be resolved in favor of requiring the debate and justification
procedures of APA § 553. This canon of construction is all the more urgent in the
context of this case where the inevitable consequence of the DOE's hasty actions is to
turn otherwise innocent behavior into criminal behavior. A further reason to follow
this canon of construction in this case is the real, and not fancied, ambient presence of
first amendment values.
687 F.2d at 1288 (McKay, J., dissenting).
66. Id at 1291.
67. Id. The policy basis of the dissent's position is revealed by the statement that an
agency "should not be permitted to exempt itself" from the APA. Id (emphasis supplied).
68. The dissent appears to have taken the following admonition of Kenneth Davis to heart:
"Probably every court should be alert to miss no opportunity to contribute to achievement of
the ideal that every affected person should have opportunity to pariicipate in administrative
policy making." 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at § 7:6. See 687 F.2d at 1293-94 (McKay, J.,
dissenting).
69. See supra note 44.
70. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.





The majority's opinion in Thompson was confusing and unpersuasive be-
cause it focused on the designation of the additional land as off-limits, rather
than classifying the implementing regulation and delineating the proper
scope of review. The dissent, although raising valid concerns about the po-
tential abuse of generic rulemaking, is incorrect in light of the relevant au-
thorizing statute and its legislative history. 73  The Supreme Court's
pronouncements in Vermont Yankee and Baltimore Gas & Electric effectively
ended the era in which the courts could subject agency rulemaking to proce-
dural requirements not imposed by the applicable organic statute or by the
APA. Thompson, even though its analysis can be faulted, demonstrates that
the Tenth Circuit's approach to administrative rulemaking follows that of
the Supreme Court.
II. ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS
A. Overview of Estoppel Against the Government
In 1961, the Tenth Circuit for the first time recognized, in dictum, that
estoppel might lie against the federal government. 74 Chief Judge Murrah,
writing for the court, stated that despite the strong policy against allowing
estoppel to be asserted against the government, "we will not allow the gov-
ernment to deal dishonestly or capriciously with its citizens. It must not play
an ignoble part or do a shabby thing."' '75 It has taken over two decades,
however, for the Tenth Circuit to use the estoppel doctrine against the gov-
ernment. In Home Savizgs & Loan Association v. Nimmo,76 a 1982 case, the
Tenth Circuit held that the federal government was estopped. Even then,
the decision was not unanimous.
77
The issue of whether equitable estoppel can be invoked against the gov-
ernment has caused considerable controversy. 78 The issue appeared to have
been put to rest in 1947 when Justice Frankfurter, in Federal Crop Insurance
Corp. v. Merrill,79 roundly rejected the notion that the federal government
could be equitably estopped. 80 Since Merrill, however, the concept has re-
fused to die."' The Ninth Circuit, for example, has taken a leading role in
72. This conclusion is supported by Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983), which approved the use of a generic regulation by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
73. See supra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
74. Massaglia v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 258, 262 (10th Cir. 1961).
75. Id
76. 695 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982).
77. See id. at 1255 (McKay, J., dissenting).
78. See, e.g., Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub norn. Schweiker v.
Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (issue discussed by both Judge Oakes, writing for the majority, and
by Judge Newman, in a concurrence).
79. 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
80. Justice Frankfurter stated: "Whatever the form in which the Government functions,
anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately
ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his
authority." Id. at 384.
81. An article discussing collateral estoppel in administrative proceedings quotes a passage
1984]
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recognizing the estoppel doctrine in cases involving the government. 82 Re-
gardless of how strongly the Supreme Court has disapproved of the use of
equitable estoppel against the government, 8 3 the doctrine survives, although
it by no means flourishes.
84
In light of the Court's recent rejection of government estoppel in
Schwetker v. Hansen ,85 the Home Savings decision, which recognizes a claim of
estoppel against the government, is a major development and a major step
within the Tenth Circuit. 86  Further, because of the analysis used by the
Tenth Circuit, Home Savings appears to be at the cutting edge of a post-Han-
sen trend. The majority ruled that the government could be estopped in this
case because the dispute involved a "commercial transaction." '8 7 In so do-
ing, the Tenth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit8 8 and the Ninth Circuit89
in relying on the private/commercial or proprietary/sovereign distinction to
avoid the prohibition against using estoppel against the government. 9°
B. Statement of the Case
A lending institution loaned a couple $34,000 to buy a house. The loan
from Shakespeare's Measure For Measure in order to characterize the state of the equitable estop-
pel doctrine as it relates to the government: "The law hath not been dead, though it hath
slept." Mogel, Resjud~ata and Collateral Estoppel in Administrative Proceedings, 30 BAYLOR L. REV.
463, 463 (1978) (quoting W. SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, Act II, Scene 2, line 90).
82. See, e.g. , Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980); Oki v. INS, 598 F.2d 1160 (9th
Cir. 1979); Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
83. The Court recently rejected an opportunity to resolve the issues raised by circuit court
recognition that estoppel may be available against the federal government. See Schweiker v.
Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981).
84. See Parcel, Making the Government Fight Fairly. Estopping the United States, 27A ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 41 (1982); Note, Equitable Estoppel ofthe Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 551
(1979); see also 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at § 20:6 (2d ed. 1983).
85. 450 U.S. 785 (1981). Hansen rejected a claim of estoppel, but did not categorically
reject estopping the government. See id. at 790.
86. The Tenth Circuit has reviewed several cases dealing with the issue of estoppel against
the government, rejecting the estoppel claim in each. See Sweeten v. USDA, 684 F.2d 679 (10th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971
(1981); Albrechtsen v. Andrus, 570 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818 (1979);
Enfield v. Kleppe, 566 F.2d 1139 (10th Cir. 1977); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Hickel, 432 F.2d
587 (10th Cir. 1970); Massaglia v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1961); Sanders v.
Commissioner, 225 F.2d 629 (1955); United States v. Carter, 197 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1952); and
United States v. Fitch, 185 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1950).
87. 695 F.2d at 1254.
88. See Meister Bros. v. Macy, 674 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1982) (estopping administrator of
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) from asserting failure to file a form as a
defense to a settlement claim when FEMA had indicated it intended to pay the claim);
Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1982) (estopping the federal government
from disclaiming representations made by a postal worker).
89. See Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981). Laguna Hermosa
was decided three weeks after Hansen. It did not mention Hansen, but nonetheless it held that
the United States was estopped from denying an extension for a concession contract. Id at
1380.
90. Although the court did not refer to the concession contract in Laguna Hermosa as a
"commercial transaction," this characterization appears to be accurate in light of the fact that
the case involved a contract between a concessionaire and the United States for operailig a
concession on federal land. Laguna Hermosa, 643 F.2d at 1377. In both Portmann and Meister
Bros. , however, the Seventh Circuit expressly relied on the fact the subject matter of the dispute
giving rise to the issue of estoppel was a "commercial transaction." Mei-ter Bros., 674 F.2d at
1177; Portmann, 674 F.2d at 1169.
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was secured by a note and a mortgage, and guaranteed by the Veterans
Administration (VA). 9 The lending institution subsequently assigned the
note, mortgage, and guaranty to Home Savings & Loan, the plaintiff in Home
Savthgs. 92 Some years later, the couple defaulted on their loan, a foreclosure
sale was held, and Home Savings & Loan, with VA approval, 9 3 purchased
the house. 94 Home Savings & Loan, exercising an option granted by federal
regulation, 95 then conveyed the property to the VA and demanded both re-
imbursement for the amount paid at foreclosure and payment under the
loan guaranty certificate for losses incurred on the loan.
96
The significant event giving rise to the estoppel controversy occurred
when Home Savings transferred the house to the VA. At approximately the
same time as the transfer, the original lending institution, by coincidence,
informed the VA that the wife's signatures on both the note and the mort-
gage might be forgeries. 97 Instead of informing Home Savings & Loan of
this fact, the VA investigated the possible forgery, in the meantime selling
the house and processing and paying Home Savings' loan guaranty claim. 98
Twelve days after paying the loan guaranty claim the VA demanded return
of the payment, based upon regulations99 and a statute' 00 which permit the
Administrator of the VA to deny liability under a loan guaranty if a signa-
ture on the loan is forged. Home Savings returned the money to the VA, but
refused to pay an additional sum for expenses demanded by the VA, which
amount the VA subsequently offset against other amounts due Home
Savings.'o
Home Savings brought suit to recover amounts claimed under the loan
guaranty, and the trial court held that the VA was estopped from asserting
the forgery defense because of its acceptance of the deed with knowledge of
the potential forgery. 10 2 The Tenth Circuit ruled that although the failure
to disclose the potential forgery to Home Savings & Loan was inaction and
therefore not grounds for estoppel, 10 3 the VA's acceptance of the deed from
Home Savings and its subsequent sale of the house constituted "affirmative
acts" in a "commercial transaction" which would justify estopping the VA
from denying the Home Savings claim.
10 4
91. Home Sa., 695 F.2d at 1252.
92. Id
93. Lenders holding VA guaranteed mortgages can recover (with some exceptions) the
amount paid at a foreclosure sale if the VA has previously authorized the bid. 10 C.F.R.
§ 36.4320 (1983). This recovery does not affect the lender's right to recoup any losses under the
VA loan guarantee. Id.
94. 695 F.2d at 1252.
95. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4320(a)(1) (1983).
96. 695 F.2d at 1252. The guaranty certificate, which guarantees a lender reimbursement
for its loan losses, was authorized by 38 U.S.C. § 1810 (1982). 695 F.2d at 1252.
97. 695 F.2d at 1252.
98. Id
99. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4325(a) (1983).
100. 38 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982).
101. 695 F.2d at 1252.
102. Id at 1253.
103. Inaction, by itself, is generally not sufficient to establish estoppel against the govern-
ment. See Sweeten v. USDA, 684 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1982).
104. 695 F.2d at 1254.
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C. Analysis of the Decision
The majority's analysis was relatively brief. Pointing to language in
Supreme Court cases which indicated that estoppel against the government
might be proper in some circumstances, 10 5 the court proceeded to distin-
guish the Court's decisions rejecting estoppel on the basis that none of those
cases had involved a commercial transaction.10 6 No reasoning was given to
support the commercial transaction distinction. The court merely held the
distinction existed, and that Home Savings was entitled to an estoppel based
on the VA's acceptance of the deed without giving notice of the potential
forgery. 107
Judge McKay wrote a lengthy and forceful dissent, criticizing the ma-
jority's commercial transaction distinction as being "chimerical rather than
precedential."' 0 8 Estoppel against the government was not rejected out-of-
hand. 109 Instead, the dissent criticized the majority's "commercial transac-
tion" distinction and urged that a different test be used to determine if estop-
pel should lie against the government. The dissent's test contained two
questions: "(1) did misleading conduct induce reasonable detrimental reli-
ance? and (2) are there nevertheless circumstances that caution the court to
withhold the exercise of equitable powers?" ' 10 According to the dissent, the
Supreme Court's government estoppel cases could be explained as involving
a failure to satisfy these requirements: either the plaintiff had failed to estab-
lish the elements of an estoppel,' I or "circumstances"-particularly separa-
tion of powers concerns-made exercise of equitable power inappropriate.' 12
Judge McKay disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the VA had en-
gaged in detrimentally misleading conduct, the first part of his test, and
therefore found estoppel unavailable without ever reaching the second prong
of his test.' 13
105. Id at 1253.
106. Id. at 1254.
107. Id at 1254-55. The estoppel arose because once the VA received the deed, Home Sav-
ings had no way to collect its deficiency except through the guaranty. In the majority view, the
VA caused Home Savings to lock itself into a situation where it was effectively at the mercy of
the VA. Hence, the VA should have disclosed the potential fraud, thereby giving Home Savings
an opportunity to consider whether to take a chance with the VA (knowing the possibility the
guaranty might be avoided) or to dispose of the deed independently. The majority felt that the
VA's routine acceptance of the deed in the above circumstances justified estopping a fraud
defense to payment of the guaranty. Id
108. Id. at 1255 (McKay, J., dissenting). In speaking of the commercial transaction distinc-
tion, the dissent noted its concern that the majority's standard would inaugurate "a procession
of future cases that will be distinguished on the basis of 'finespun and capricious' characteriza-
tions." Id at 1258. Cf Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955) (noting that
state court decisions on the governmental/proprietary distinction are confused and
irreconcilable).
109. 695 F.2d at 1261 (McKay, J., dissenting).
110. Id at 1259.
111. Id at 1260.
112. Id. at 1260-61. Judge McKay's analysis is provocative, as it harmonizes the equitable
policy cuIsideraios if-ilitati.g t.ward an estoppc. (.g. the inequity of perit.ng a party to
profit through deceptive acts) with the policy considerations militating against holding the gov-
ernment estopped (e.g. vast demands on the public fisc). By balancing the two policy factors
against each other once the elements of estoppel have been established, the dissent's test protects
the government while preventing abuse of citizens.




Despite what appears to be a blanket refusal by the Supreme Court to
recognize estoppel against the government, the Court has not eliminated the
possibility of governmental estoppel.1 '4 The Tenth Circuit, in Home Savings,
has ventured into the uncertain area of estopping the government. In so
doing, it has joined several sister circuits in trying to find a formula that will
escape repudiation by the Supreme Court. As long as estopping the govern-
ment remains a tool of last resort, to be used only when it would be ex-
tremely unfair to do otherwise, the Supreme Court will continue to tolerate
the infrequent recognition of estoppel exemplified by the Tenth Circuit's de-
cision in Home Savings. The potentially broad reach of the Tenth Circuit's
"commercial transaction" estoppel doctrine, however, along with the diffi-
culties inherent in distinguishing commercial from proprietary transactions,
promise that estoppel issues will continue to be a lively subject within the
Tenth Circuit.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION
A. Introduction
Determining the scope of judicial review is crucial for determining the
proper role of the courts in reviewing administrative action. If the scope is
too limited, the function of judicial review is meaningless.'I15 Conversely, the
constitutional scheme of separation of powers is violated when courts substi-
tute their judgment for that of the agency.' ' 6 To strike a balance, section 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 17 delineates six separate stan-
dards for determining the scope of judicial review of agency action, although
only two of these standards are frequently used by the courts. Under the
first, administrative action is illegal if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."' 18 In Ci'tiens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,' 19 the Supreme Court held that judicial review
under this standard entails determining whether all factors relevant to an
administrative decision were considered or whether decision reflects a clear
error of judgment. 120 This standard creates a narrow scope of review because
to the litigation, pointing out that Home Savings had made its election prior to the VA's receipt
of any information concerning potential fraud. Given Home Savings' independent decision, the
dissent found no evidence of the VA induced detrimental reliance. Absent such reliance, all of
the elements for estoppel were not present. Id. at 1262. Judge McKay's analysis is weakened,
however, by his failure to establish that Home Savings' election was binding.
114. Since Merrll the Supreme Court has not ruled that the government can never be es-
topped. In fact, decisions by the Supreme Court suggest that some as yet undefined government
actions may justify estoppel. For example, the Supreme Court recently stated "[t~his Court has
never decided what type of conduct by a Government employee will estop the Government . . , " Han-
sen, 450 U.S. at 788 (emphasis supplied), thereby implying that some foundation for estoppel
does exist.
115. See Schwartz, Some Recent Adminisiratwe Law Trends: Delegations andjudicial Review, 1982
Wis. L. RE%'. 208, 227 (1982).
116. See generally United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956).
117. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
118. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
119. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
120. d. at 416.
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a reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. 
12 1
Under the second often applied standard of review, agency action is
improper if it is "unsupported by substantial evidence."' 22 Unlike the arbi-
trary or capricious standard, which is applicable to all agency action, 123 the
substantial evidence standard is applicable in only two situations: 1) when
the administrative action being reviewed is formal rulemaking conducted
under the APA; 124 or 2) when the reviewed administrative action is an adju-
dication.' 25 Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."
1 26
Although these general guidelines are useful, one must look to individ-
ual cases to discern which standard will be applied and how rigorous judicial
review will be under each. Moreover, the standard of review to be used in
each case is not always clear. Often a party challenging agency action as-
serts that a more demanding standard should apply, such as substantial evi-
dence, but the reviewing court will choose a more lenient standard, such as
the arbitrary or capricious test. It is therefore important to review case law
to determine which sets of facts give rise to which standards. The following
paragraphs will review several of the decisions handed down by the Tenth
Circuit this term and will analyze the scope of judicial review applied in
each.
B. Review Utilizing the Arbitrary, Capritous, or Abuse of Discretion Standard
In order to understand how the Tenth Circuit applies the arbitrary or
capricious standard, four cases will be discussed briefly. The first is Anderson
v. Department of Housing.12 7 In Anderson, the Tenth Circuit considered which
standard to apply in reviewing a Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD) mortgage assignment decision. By statute, 128 the Secretary
was authorized to prescribe regulations to implement a mortgage insurance
program designed to assist low-income families in purchasing a home. One
provision of the implementing regulations permitted HUD to accept mort-
gage assignments for the purpose of preventing foreclosures. 129 The statute
121. Id. In the recent decision of Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983), the Supreme Court noted that the arbitrary and capricious
standard articulated in Overton Park is still the correct formulation. 103 S. Ct. at 2257. The
Court also noted: "It is not our task to determine what decision we, as Commissioners [of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission], would have reached. Our only task is to determine whether
the commission has considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection be-
tween the facts found and the choice made." Id
122. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982).
123. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413-14.
124. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982).
.25. d
126. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
127. 701 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1983).
128. 12 U.S.C. § 1709(a) (1982).
129. 24 C.F.R. § 203.640(a) (1983).
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did not mention such a provision.1
3 0
HUD denied Anderson's request that HUD accept an assignment after
her default and she brought suit challenging the denial. 13 ' The Tenth Cir-
cuit characterized HUD's refusal as "informal agency action" and therefore
held that the arbitrary or capricious standard should apply.13 2 The court
affirmed the agency action, holding that because the record showed that the
agency followed its own internal guidelines and had not acted irrationally,
the refusal was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.'
33
A second case providing insight into application of the abuse of discre-
tion standard involved an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion (OSHRC) violation of its own procedural guidelines. The court in Dye
Construction Co. v. OSHRC 134 held that the violation did not constitute an
abuse of discretion, and affirmed OSHRC's decision.
The violation arose when the administrative complaint against Dye was
amended to extend the period of Dye's alleged improper behavior. 135
OSHRC was required by its regulations to set forth its reasons for amending
a complaint. 136 Although OSHRC failed to do so in this case, the court
noted that the regulation provides no sanctions for such a failure, and that
dismissal of the complaint was therefore not automatically required. 137 The
court then found that the petitioning construction company was not sur-
prised or prejudiced by the amendment; hence, the failure to comply with
the regulations was not an abuse of discretion.
138
A third case reviewed under the arbitrary or capricious standard was
American Trucking Association v. ICC,3 9 examining an ICC decision granting a
railroad company's subsidiary unrestricted authority to operate as a motor
carrier. The Tenth Circuit held that this grant of authority did not consti-
tute an abuse of discretion.14
0
By statute, the ICC is permitted to grant motor carrier authority to a
railroad subsidiary only upon a showing that the transaction is consistent
with the public interest, will enable the railroad to use its rail service to
public advantage, and will not restrain competition. 141 The Supreme Court
has held that to meet the statutory standard "special circumstances" must be
shown. 142
The plaintiffs had two separate arguments. First, they argued that one
permit lacked the required finding of special circumstances. 143 Second, they
130. 701 F.2d at 114.
131. Id. at 113.
132. Id.
133. Id at 114-15.
134. 698 F.2d 423 (10th Cir. 1983).
135. Id. at 425.
136. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.33(a)(3) (1983).
137. 698 F.2d at 425.
138. Id.
139. 703 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1983).
140. Id. at 462.
141. 49 U.S.C. § 11344(c) (1976).
142. American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 355 U.S. 141, 151-52 (1957).
143. 703 F.2d at 462.
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argued that the Commission's reversal of a lower administrative tribunal's
finding of no special circumstances on a second permit was not supported by
the record. 1
44
The Tenth Circuit's decision to uphold the ICC145 is not as significant
as its delineation of the appropriate standard of review. The court relied
upon a formulation announced in an earlier Tenth Circuit case, Midwestern
Transportation, Inc. v. ICC.14 6 In both Midwestern and American Trucking the
Tenth Circuit combined the arbitrary or capricious standard and the sub-
stantial evidence standard for purposes of reviewing ICC decisions. 14 7 Such
a combining of standards, however, seems inconsistent with the leading case
of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe' 4 8 which noted that the sub-
stantial evidence standard was only applicable in statutorily defined circum-
stances.' 41 Until the Tenth Circuit establishes that those circumstances are
present in this class of cases, its hybrid standard is improper.
Finally, in another ICC case, Turner Brothers Trucking Co. v. ICC, 150 the
administrative action at issue was a denial of a request for a waiver from an
ICC rule.'' The court, relying upon Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe,' 152 noted that it could not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency' 53 and upheld denial of the waiver. 154 Although the court did not
characterize the waiver denial, the holding implies that the denial was "in-
formal" agency action and therefore subject to the arbitrary or capricious
standard of review. '55 Turner Brothers also rejected a due process challenge,
holding that the Constitution did not require a hearing on a decision deny-
ing a request for a specific waiver from a rule of general application.156
144. Id at 463.
145. Id. The Tenth Circuit equated a finding of special circumstances with a finding of
action in the public interest. The administrative records supported this finding, justifying grant
of the permits. Id. at 462-63.
146. 635 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1980).
147. In Midwestern Tramp., the court defined the standard of review as follows:
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) provides . . . that a reviewing
court shall set aside agency action if determined to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion. or otherwise not in accordance with law or unsupported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole.
The ICC interpretations of its regulations and the facts supporting a grant or
denial of a certificate require recognition of its expertise and our deference thereto.
Id at 774 (emphasis supplied, citation omitted).
In American Trucking Ass'n, the court defined the standard of review as follows:
It is axiomatic that the scope of review by an appellate court of a Commission
decision is a narrow one. We may not set aside Commission action unless it be arbi-
trary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or unless it be otherwise not in accord
with law or unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
703 F.2d at 462 (emphasis supplied).
148. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
149. Id. at 414. Those circumstances exist when an agency engages in rulemaking required
to be on the record, or an adjudication. 11 U.S.C. § 702(2)(E) (1982); see also id. at §§ 553(c),
554(c)(2).
150. 684 F.2d 701 (10th Cir. 1982).
151. 49 C.F.R. § 1057.12(g), (h) (1982). This regulation details billing requirements im-
posed on carriers leasing their equipment.
152. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
153. 684 F.2d at 703.
154. Id at 704.
155. Id at 703.
156. Id. at 703-04.
19841 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In summary, plaintiffs were not successful in challenging informal
agency action during the survey period. In each of the cases reviewed which
applied the "arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion" standard, agency
action was sustained.
C. Substantial Evidence Review
The substantial evidence standard is less deferential to an agency than
the arbitrary or capricious standard. It is therefore not surprising that of the
thirty administrative law cases reviewed during the survey period, two of the
three cases where a federal agency was reversed were a result of the agency
failing to satisfy the substantial evidence test. ' 5 7 Both cases involved a denial
of Social Security benefits.
In the first case, Broadbent v. Hams,' 58 the plaintiff sought Social Secur-
ity disability benefits. Broadbent reviewed a decision by an administrative
law judge (ALJ) who had recommended that plaintiffs application for bene-
fits be denied because the plaintiff was not "disabled" as defined by the rele-
vant statute. 159 The ALJ relied heavily on the finding of no disability by the
single physician who examined the plaintiff on behalf of the Social Security
Administration,' 6° rejecting the opinions of six independent physicians who
found the plaintiff to be disabled.16' The Tenth Circuit noted that although
ALJ determinations are generally binding on a reviewing court,1 62 in this
case the ALJ had not given sufficient weight to the testimony of the six in-
dependent doctors, who had had much more experience examining the
plaintiff. 163 Considering the record as a whole, the plaintiffs prima facie
case of disability was not rebutted and the administrative decision did not
meet the substantial evidence test.164 Although the court did not expressly
articulate the basis for its ruling, the court in effect ruled that the medical
report by the one government-hired doctor did not constitute the "more
than a mere scintilla"' 65 of evidence necessary to sustain the administrative
decision. 166
The second case overturning an administrative decision under the sub-
stantial evidence test is Cavits v. Schweiker.i 6' The issue in Cavitl, as in
Broadbent, was whether an applicant was eligible for Social Security disabil-
157. These two cases Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1983) and Cavitt v.
Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1983), will be discussed immediately below. The third case
referred to is Home Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Nimmo, 695 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982). For a
discussion of Home Savings, see supra notes 74-114 and accompanying text.
158. 698 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1983).
159. Id. at 411. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) defines "disability" for purposes
of the Social Security laws.
160. 698 F.2d at 409.
161. Id
162. Id at 413 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971)).
163. 698 F.2d at 414.
164. Id
165. Id See also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (defining substantial evi-
dence to mean relevant evidence a reasonable mind would accept as supporting an administra-
tive conclusion).
166. See 698 F.2d at 414.
167. 704 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1983).
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ity benefits. 168 Here, as in Broadbent, the court cited Richardson v. Perales,
169
and held that a "reasonable mind" would not conclude that the plaintiff was
not disabled within the meaning of the social security laws.170 Again, as in
Broadbent, the available medical evidence weighed strongly in favor of the
applicant. 171
In Meredith Corp. v. NLRB, 172 the court reviewed a NLRB decision that
directors and production managers were not "supervisors" within the mean-
ing of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).17 3 The NLRB held that
the employees were not supervisors, and that the employer violated the
NLRA by failing to negotiate collectively with these employees.1 74 The ba-
sis of the NLRB's decision was that any control the directors or production
managers exercised over other employees was either routine or motivated by
artistic reasons, and that this control was not supervisory. 175 The court, af-
ter making a detailed review, sustained the NLRB's decision because it was
supported by substantial evidence.176 Doubt was expressed, however, con-
cerning the relevance of "artistic motivation" in determining the supervisory
status of a particular position.'
77
The substantial evidence test was also used in CCI, Inc. V. OSHRC 178 to
determine whether a citation issued pursuant to the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA) 1 79 was sustainable. OSHA regulations require
shaping and shoring of excavation trenches when certain soil conditions are
present.' 8 0 OSHRC held CCI in violation of these regulations.' 8 ' On re-
view, the court focused on evidence pertaining to soil conditions.' 8 2 Because
of strong evidence that the kinds of soil conditions requiring shoring or
trenching were present, 8 3 the agency's burden under the substantial evi-
dence test was met.
18 4
IV. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION: CONTRACTS FOR INTERSTATE SALES OF
POWER
In Utah v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 1 5 the Tenth Circuit re-
168. Id. at 1194.
169. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
170. 704 F.2d at 1195.
171. Id at 1194-95.
172. 679 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1982).
173. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
174. 679 F.2d at 1335.
175. Id at 1341.
176. Id. at 1345.
177. Id at 1344.
178. 688 F.2d 88 (10th Cir. 1982).
179. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
180. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(c) (1983).
181. 688 F.2d at 89.
182. Id at 89-90.
183. Thie court licid that it-, a nwt-unaterial excavation the applicability of the trenching
regulations turned on the weakest significant component of the soil. Id at 90. The substantial
evidence inquiry could therefore be satisfied without showing the soil was exclusively of the type
covered by 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(c). 688 F.2d at 90.
184. 688 F.2d at 90.
185. 691 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1982).
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jected an attempt by the Utah Public Service Commission (PSC) to circum-
vent the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC).' 86 The specific issue in Utah v. FERC concerned a wholesale con-
tract between Utah Power, a utility under the jurisdiction of the Utah PSC,
and Sierra Pacific Power Company, a utility operating in Nevada and Cali-
fornia. 1 7 The Utah PSC asserted jurisdiction over this contract based on its
jurisdiction over Utah Power's generating facilities. 8 Finding the FERC
approved contract not in the best interest of Utah's utility customers, PSC
ordered Utah Power not to comply with the terms of the contract.' 8 9
FERC, upon Sierra Pacific's motion for declaratory relief, held that its juris-
diction over the contract was exclusive, and directed Utah Power to comply
with the contract.'9° The Tenth Circuit then addressed the conflict on a
petition for review of the FERC order.'9'
The Tenth Circuit rejected PSC's assertion of jurisdiction. Congress,
the circuit held, had given FERC exclusive jurisdiction over contracts for
wholesale interstate power sales.1 92 The PSC's argument that the FERC
approval was in effect an order to construct additional generating facilities,
and therefore not within FERC's exclusive jurisdiction, was rejected.
1 9 3
FERC's order merely approved the contract for sale of power; because it did
not mandate the manner in which the contract was to be performed, the
order remained within FERC's exclusive jurisdiction.194 As an alternate ba-
sis for upholding FERC, the Tenth Circuit characterized the PSC order as
an attempt to benefit Utah utility customers at the expense of out-of-state
utility customers, which was invalid as an attempted protectionist meas-
ure.195 Finally, given the parties' knowledge that FERC had exclusive juris-
diction over the contract, a contractual clause requiring approval by
"regulatory authorities having jurisdiction" was held to contemplate only
FERC's approval. 1
96
Summing up its decision, the court noted that Congress had placed such
contracts under the exclusive review of FERC, and had placed FERC's deci-
sions under review by the courts. If in fact the contract became unduly bur-
densome, "surely relief would be available."' 19 7 Absent such a showing
(which was not urged upon the court), the only proper course of action was
to affirm FERC's exclusive jurisdiction.
186. It has long been recognized that FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale inter-
state sales of electric power under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 794a-828c (1982). See,
e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964).
187. 691 F.2d at 445.
188. Id. at 446.
189. Id.
190. Id
191. Id at 445.
192. Id at 447-48. The court noted that FERC did not have exclusive jurisdiction over
tntrastate power sales, nor over interstate retail power sales. Id at 447.
193. Id at 448.
194. Id
195. Id (citing New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982)).
196. 691 F.2d at 448.
197. Id at 448-49.
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V. SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION EXCEPTION TO PRIMARY
JURISDICTION
In Mountain States Natural Gas Corp. v. Petroleum Corp. of Texas, 198 the
Tenth Circuit held that the presence of a "substantial federal question"
could circumvent the bar to original judicial review created by the primary
jurisdiction doctrine. 199 In arriving at this conclusion the Tenth Circuit ex-
tended precedent previously recognizing that plaintiffs presenting substan-
tial federal questions were not required to exhaust their administrative
remedies. 2° ° The analysis below questions the propriety of that extension.
Mountatn States began when the defendant Petroleum Corp. of Texas
(Petco) obtained a state agency 20 ' order permitting Petco to pool its leased
acreage with the acreage of Mountain States, another oil company, for the
purpose of producing an oil well. 20 2 The pooling order required Petco to
give all persons with interests in the common field, including Mountain
States, notice of drilling at least thirty days before drilling commenced.
20 3
Upon receipt of the notice an interested party had the option of paying esti-
mated well costs (provided by Petco), or of paying its share of production
costs from revenues.20 4 Failure to pay the estimated costs resulted in a risk
penalty of 200% of the required payment.
20 5
Petco sent the required notice to Mountain States, although not within
time periods stipulated by the order. 20 6 Mountain States never retrieved the
notice from its post office box.20 7 Petco was aware of this, but it took no
further action to notify Mountain States that drilling was commencing, in-
stead assessing the 200% penalty against Mountain States' share of the pro-
ceeds from the well.20 8 Litigation ensued when Petco refused to permit
Mountain States, independently apprised of the drilling, to pay its share of
198. 693 F.2d 1015 (10th Cir. 1983).
199. Primary jurisdiction is a court-made doctrine, grounded in separation of powers con-
cerns. It allocates decisionmaking power between a court and an administrative agency having
concurrent jurisdiction over a dispute. When applicable, the doctrine mandates deferring judi-
cial consideration of an issue until the agency has given its decision. Following agency action
the court exercises a review power of varying scope. For example, administrative interpretations
of law may be subjected to de novo review, while administrative factfinding may be given great
deference. One essential feature of the doctrine is that the court upon review may not usurp the
decisionmaking power allocated to the agency. See generally 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at § 22:1
(2d ed. 1983); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 166-168 (1976).
200. See 693 F.2d at 1019.
201. Mountain States involved the interaction between a federal court and a state agency's
primary jurisdiction. The policies which underly the primary jurisdiction doctrine should apply
with equal force to both federal and state agencies. See supranote 199. Nonetheless, because
application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the federal court [state agency context may
raise different considerations than those present in the federal court] federal agency context, see
4 K. DAvIS, supra note 18, at § 26:14 (2d ed. 1983), the Tenth Circuit should have examined the
intrinsic propriety of using the primary jurisdiction doctrine in Mountain States.
202. 693 F.2d at 1017. The order permitted Petco to capture the oil from a common field
over Mountain States' objection. Id.
203. id at j0t7.
204. Id.
205. Id
206. Id. at 1017-18.
207. Id at 1017.
208. Id
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estimated costs and recover the 200% penalty. 20 9
Mountain States claimed Petco's failure to provide the required notice
constituted a denial of due process. 2 10 Petco responded by claiming that the
New Mexico Oil Conservation Division (Division) had primary jurisdiction
over the question of compliance with its orders. 2 "1 The federal district court
first ruled in Petco's favor, dismissing the complaint until the Division had
considered the issues; upon motion for reconsideration, however, the district
court set aside its dismissal and heard the case.212 The district court, holding
in favor of Mountain States, did not rest its decision on due process grounds,
instead holding that the Division's order required actual notice at least thirty
days prior to drilling, and that Petco had failed to meet that requirement.
2 13
Petco appealed on the grounds that the district court erred by failing to
recognize the Division's primary jurisdiction, that Mountain States' due pro-
cess claim was insufficient as a matter of law, and that the construction of
the notice was not raised by the pleadings. 2 14 The Tenth Circuit did not
reach the merits of the due process claim, resting its decision on the district
court's construction of the notice.21 5 In arriving at the decision on the mer-
its, however, the Tenth Circuit created an exception to the primary jurisdic-
tion doctrine, allowing courts to bypass agencies when a plaintiff merely
presents a substantial federal question.2' 6 This exception, however, is so
broad that it undermines the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
The Tenth Circuit's exception was premised on the close relationship
between the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. 2 17 Given that close relationship, conditions justifying excep-
tions to the exhaustion requirement were perceived to justify exceptions to
an agency's primary jurisdiction.2 18 Its reading of cases dealing with excep-
tions to the exhaustion doctrine led the court to conclude that when a sub-
stantial federal question was present, exhaustion, and therefore resort to
primary jurisdiction, was not required. 21 9 The result is the creation of an
exception to primary jurisdiction which is sui generis.
Martinez v. Richardson,220 an earlier Tenth Circuit decision, was the pri-
mary authority relied on in creating the substantial federal question excep-
tion. Martinez held that exhaustion was not required if existing
administrative remedies were inadequate and a "federal question is so plain
that exhaustion is excused."' 22' This proposition was articulated by relying
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Greene v. Uniled Slales.2 22 Greene, how-






215. Id at 1020.
216. Id at 1018-19.
217. See id. at 1018
218. See id. at 1018-19.
219. Id at 1019.
220. 472 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1972).
221. M. at 1125.
222. 376 U.S. 149 (1964). See 472 F2d at 1125 n.10.
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ever, said nothing about excusing the exhaustion requirement when a federal
question was plain. Quite to the contrary, the Court's holding in Greene was
limited to concluding that existing administrative remedies were inadequate
with respect to Greene's claim. 223 Thus, Martinez' language concerning a
federal question exception to exhaustion is not supported by Supreme Court
precedent.
Further, although Martinez referred to a federal question exception to
the exhaustion doctrine, Martinez was in fact decided upon traditional
grounds for bypassing the exhaustion requirement. Inadequacy of existing
administrative remedies is a well recognized exception to the exhaustion re-
quirement. 22 4 Administrative remedies were inadequate in Martinez because
the plaintiffs were elderly and infirm and because there was an extreme un-
likelihood of meaningful administrative relief.22 5 Accordingly, the actual
ground of decision in Martinez is consistent with Greene, and does not support
recognition of a general federal question exception to administrative review.
The Tenth Circuit in Mountaz States also sought to justify its refusal to
defer to the Division's primary jurisdiction by relying upon McKart v. United
Slates2 26 and Mathews v. E/dr dge. 22 7 McKart, while in fact holding that ex-
haustion was not an invariable requirement, was also a very narrow holding.
The Court noted that McKart did not involve mere premature resort to judi-
cial process, but involved a situation in which the plaintiff's failure to take
an administrative appeal prevented him from raising certain defenses to
criminal prosecution. 228 Plaintiff's interest therefore outweighed the consid-
erations of deference to agency jurisdiction underlying the exhaustion re-
quirement. 22 9 McKart therefore establishes only that when a substantial
liberty interest will be unfairly denied, exhaustion will not be required.
230
Similarly, Mathews recognized only that a procedural due process challenge
could be raised without exhaustion when hardship to the claimant outweighs
the benefits flowing from the exhaustion doctrine. 23 ' McKart and Mathews
clearly do not support the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that merely asserting a
substantial federal question justifies circumventing the exhaustion require-
ment and, by analogy, the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
There are a number of other considerations which demonstrate the
inappropriateness of the court's assumption of jurisdiction. For example,
there was no evidence in the opinion that the Division was without compe-
tence to decide constitutional questions concerning its alleged actions; in all
likelihood, the Division had such power. 232 Thus, traditional grounds for
223. See 376 U.S. at 163.
224. See 472 F.2d at 1125.
225. Id.
226. 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
227. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
228. 395 U.S. at 197.
229. id.
230. Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 491, 494 n.5 (1977) (exhaustion not
necessarily appropriate when facing criminal penalty).
231. See 424 U.S. at 330-31. See also4 K. DAvis, supra note 18, at § 22:1 (2d ed. 1983).
232. Cf 4 K. DAvis, supra note 18, at § 26:6, at 435 (2d ed. 1983) (agencies typically have
authority to decide constitutionality of their actions).
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refusing to defer to administrative remedies were not present. 2 33 In addi-
tion, under well-established principles the presence of a nonconstitutional
ground for granting plaintiff's requested relief mandated deference to the
agency.2 34 Further, deferring receipt of money, in the absence of a showing
of undue hardship, does not justify bypassing an agency.235 Given the allo-
cation of decisionmaking power reflected in the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion, with its separation of powers implications, even if exceptions to primary
jurisdiction exist arguendo, Mounlain States was clearly not a case to apply
those exceptions.
The actual relief granted by the Tenth Circuit in Mountain States also
underscores the inappropriateness of not dismissing the complaint until the
state agency had considered the issues. The Tenth Circuit's decision relied
upon the Division's own order, requiring that thirty-days notice be given
prior to drilling, to decide the case. 236 By so doing, the court prevented the
agency from enforcing its own order and ignored an important reason for the
primary jurisdiction doctrine's existence-allowing an agency to carry out its
statutory mandate.
Mountain Slates creates a rule of administrative law which deviates from
established principles. The "federal question" exception creates a large po-
tential for disturbing the proper allocation of function between court and
agency, especially because the facts of Mountain States reflect an absence of
the traditional, equitably-oriented grounds for bypassing administrative re-
view. It is submitted here that the Tenth Circuit should either repudiate the
direct holding in Mountain States, or limit it to situations akin to Martinez and
Mathews. Failure to do so may cause unforeseen increases in the federal
docket and may disrupt the legislative allocation of power between court
and agency.
VI. REJECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE MIRANDA RIGHTS
In Sorensen v. National Transportation Safey Board,237 a commercial pilot's
certificate was suspended for violation of regulations prohibiting both the
operation of an aircraft within eight hours of drinking an alcoholic beverage
or while under the influence of alcohol, 238 and the operation of an aircraft
recklessly or carelessly. 239 The pilot challenged the certificate suspension
and novelly claimed that evidence, obtained during a brief detention by air-
port security, should have been excluded from the administrative hearing
233. Cf. id § 26:1, at 414-15 (exhaustion not required where agency has no jurisdiction over
a relevant question of law, or where resort to agency would be futile).
234. Id § 26:8, at 450. See also Pub. Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40
(1958). The agency could have resolved the dispute by construing its order to require actual
rather than constructive notice, thereby precluding assessment of a risk penalty against Moun-
tain States.
235. Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976) (undue hardship from deferral of
monetary payment justified bypassing administrative proceeding).
236. 693 F.2d at 1020.
237. 684 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1982).
238. 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.11 (a)(I)-(2) (1983).
239. 14 C.F.R. § 91.9 (1983).
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pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. 240 The Tenth Circuit rejected this assertion
on the basis that no criminal charges were contemplated at the time of the
detention, that there had been no coercive atmosphere surrounding the de-
tention, and that there had been no significant deprivation of freedom. 24 1
Given these factors, the constitutional protections of Miranda were irrelevant,
and there was no mistake in admitting evidence obtained at the
detention.
2 42
A second interesting point raised by Sorenson related to the use of hear-
say in administrative proceedings. Sorenson claimed that the agency had
relied exclusively on uncorroborated hearsay in suspending his license.
24 3
The Tenth Circuit rejected this contention, but noted that whether uncor-
roborated hearsay can constitute substantial evidence remained an open
question.
244
VII. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Only one case decided during the survey period involved the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA).245 In Avt'ation Data Servzce v. FAA ,246 the issue
considered was.whether attorney fees should be awarded to a prevailing
party if the FOIA request was for commercial purposes. Here, the complain-
ant was in the business of seeking information from the government. 247 Liti-
gation ensued when the FAA refused to provide plaintiff with names and
addresses of airmen and aircraft registrants.
248
The FOIA allows attorney fees to be awarded to a complainant who is
forced to take the government to court to obtain information under the
FOIA if the complainant "substantially prevails." '249 This provision does
not, however, create an absolute right to attorney fees. 250 The Tenth Cir-
cuit, relying primarily upon several cases extensively reviewing the legisla-
tive history of the FOIA, 25 1 held that in an FOIA case seeking information
for commercial gain, some "public benefit" or willful agency misconduct
must be shown before attorney fees will be awarded. 252 "Public benefit" was
defined in terms of information which would assist citizens in making in-
formed political decisions. 253 Finding no such benefit to the public in this
240. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See 684 F.2d at 685.
241. 684 F.2d at 685-86.
242. Id.
243. Id at 686.
244. Id.
245. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
246. 687 F.2d 1319 (10th Cir. 1982).
247. Id. at 1320.
248. Id at 1321.
249. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982) provides: "The court may assess against the United
States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under
this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed."
250. 687 F.2d at 1321.
251. The court relied on La Salle Extension University v. FTC, 627 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360
(D.C. Cir. 1977). Ste 687 F.2d at 1321-22.
252. 687 F.2d at 1322.
253. Id. at 1323.
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case and no agency misconduct, the Tenth Circuit denied an award of attor-
ney fees.
254
VIII. LIMITING AGENCY RIGHT TO INSPECT REQUIRED RECORDS
In CAB v. Fronlier Airlhnes, Inc. 255 the Tenth Circuit, on rehearing en
banc, considered whether the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) had authority
to inspect all the minutes of Frontier's directors meetings without stating a
proper investigative purpose. Frontier was required to keep those records as
a condition of its operation. 256 CAB asserted that the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958257 authorized complete access to airline company records required
by statute, regardless of investigatory purpose. 258 In the original panel deci-
sion, the Tenth Circuit held that the CAB was not required to show a rele-
vant purpose in order to obtain access to the minutes.
259
Upon rehearing en banc the Tenth Circuit reversed the panel and, in a
five to three decision, held that a "rule of reason" must be applied to CAB
investigations.2 60 The basis of the decision was an interpretation of the stat-
ute granting the CAB the power to examine the records regulated airlines
are required to keep.261 The court held that the statute embodied a congres-
sional intent to limit CAB access to those records reasonably necessary to the
purpose of a particular investigation. 26 2 But the court's solution of ordering
an in camera inspection to determine what documents were necessary to
CAB's investigation is questionable. The majority went to considerable
lengths to argue that resorting to this technique should not be done on a
regular basis.263 Relying on such ad hoc solutions, however, does little to
help either an agency or a regulatee understand the limits of agency investi-
gative powers.
The dissenting judges rejected the majority's balancing concerns. Judge
McKay, dissenting alone and also joining Judge McWilliams in Judge Lo-
gan's dissent, reasoned that if welfare recipients could be required to submit
to inspection as a condition of continued benefits, 2 6 4 it was not necessary to
show any greater consideration to an airline enjoying the benefits of agency
regulation.265 All three dissenters also rejected the majority's statutory anal-
ysis, finding no congressional intent to limit CAB's right to inspect required
records.266 The dissenters viewed the majority's decision as unwarranted
(based on precedent and congressional intent) and unsound (based on the
254. Id at 1324.
255. 686 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
256. Id at 857.
257. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
258. 686 F.2d at 856.
259. CAB v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., No. 79-1584 (10th Cir. April 17, 1981), rev'd, 686 F.2d
854 (10th Cir. 1982) (en banc). See also Administrat've Law, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 59
DEN. L.J. 173, 212-15 (1982).
260. 686 F.2d at 858.
261. 49 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (Supp. V 1981).
262. 686 F.2d at 860.
263. Id
264. Id at 861 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citing Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971)).
265. 686 F.2d at 861 (McKay, J., dissenting).
266. Id at 862 (Logan, J., dissenting).
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foreseeable injection of the judiciary into agency/airline disputes).2 6 7
IX. CONCLUSION
The commentator in last year's administrative law comment appearing
in the Denver Law Journal's Ninth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey concluded
by stating that in the area of administrative law the Tenth Circuit's decisions
were "more notable for their evenhanded application of the law than for
equitable considerations.
268
This survey period, however, equitable considerations were apparent in
a number of decisions as the court addressed several controversial adminis-
trative law questions. Thompson provided an opportunity for examination of
the ongoing debate over the propriety of generic rulemaking; 269 Home Savings
found the Tenth Circuit recognizing estoppel against the government;
270
Mountain Stales created a new (and questionable) exception to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction; 271 and other decisions sparked controversy and dissent
among the judges. The opinions reviewed for this survey demonstrate the
volatility of administrative law and therefore the need for further evaluation
of existing administrative theory and precedent.
Richard A. Westfall
267. Id.
268. Admintstrative Law, Ninth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 60 DEN. L.J. 149, 176 (1983).
269. See supra notes 8-73 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 74-114 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 198-236 and accompanying text.
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